The future direction of China's cross-border insolvency laws, related issues and potential problems by Parry, R & Nan, G
 1 
The Future Direction of China’s Cross-Border Insolvency Laws, Related 
Issues and Potential Problems 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The enactment of China’s bankruptcy laws in 2006 was a necessary step in 
the development of its economy.  This law represented a significant 
modernisation of the insolvency framework, supporting the transforming 
economy, but it was also a law of political expediency, for the enhancement of 
external relations.  One aspect of the enhancement of external relations was 
the provision of cross-border insolvency rules.  However this complex area of 
law was addressed in only one article, which was only a starting point, leaving 
many details unaddressed, and further reforms are required.  In particular, it is 
desirable that the law provides a greater level of predictability as to the likely 
outcomes of cross-border insolvencies, to encourage inward trade and 
investment, as well as encourage external trade.  Both inbound and outbound 
business dealings are important to China’s continued economic development.  
 
It is clear also, however, that insolvency law and practice is still a developing 
area for China.  The establishment of a modern and unified system of 
insolvency laws was a big step for China, representing a sacrifice of tight 
controls on insolvencies, but the impact of this law in practice is only recently 
developing, with a loosening of state controls, after a very slow start.1  The 
establishment of a cross-border insolvency framework represents a further 
challenge; one that is likely to beset with considerable difficulties, as any 
further development of this law would potentially entail some further loss of 
control over proceedings, not least in outbound cases, and resistance may be 
anticipated.  In keeping with China’s historical approach to law-making in the 
area of bankruptcy law, it is likely that the cross-border insolvency framework 
                                            
1 Numbers of bankruptcies remain low, due to a government preference for mergers and 
restructurings and deregistrations as alternatives to liquidation and some courts placing 
restrictions on the acceptances of cases.  However the Supreme People’s Court reported an 
increase of 54% in bankruptcy cases in 2016, attributed in part to efforts to eliminate zombie 
companies and an upward trend was reported in the first half of 2017.    
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will develop gradually and with caution.  This article assesses the way forward 
in respect of cross-border insolvency laws, contending that an incremental 
approach over a period of years, in three broad stages, is required, with more 
developed and country specific approaches providing a link, or interim stage, 
between the clarification of the Article 5 and the formal adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in China.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The enactment of the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 2006 was a 
notable milestone, representing the culmination of 12 years of legislative 
wrangling. The process of economic development, as well as the pressures of 
its external relations, meant that China could no longer forestall the 
introduction of a reformed, market driven, insolvency law to regulate its 
socialist market economy. 2  The formal publication of this new Chinese 
insolvency legislation was a notable development in a number of respects. 
The presence of an insolvency law would have, at one time, been thought of 
as alien to the planned economy,3 as it would not have been thought that 
state-owned enterprises could be bankrupt, and their affairs did not tend to be 
conducted on credit and debit lines. 4   The 2006 Law, on the face of it, 
provided a modern insolvency system, simple in details, along the lines of 
established systems elsewhere, with new innovations including administrators 
and creditors’ committees.  The new law also introduced a unified system, 
applying to both private enterprises and state owned enterprises (although not 
individuals), replacing a fragmented approach to insolvencies, which had also 
been necessitated by the vastly differing levels of economic development in 
the country. 
                                            
2 R Parry and H Zhang, “China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles” 
(2008) 8 JCLS 113-141 
3 A Tang, Insolvency in China and Hong Kong, A Practitioner’s Perspective (Hong Kong, 
Sweet and Maxwell, Asia), 3.04; R Parry and H Zhang, “Introduction” in R Parry, Y Xu and H 
Zhang (eds), China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Ashgate, 2009), p 9. 
4 Wang Weiguo notes that transfers of funds and materials between SOEs were regarded as 
"adjustments in accordance with state plans", rather than as credits and debits: Wang Weiguo 
& Roman Tomasic (eds), Reform of PRC Securities and Insolvency Laws (Beijing: Press of 
the China University of Political Science and Law, 1999), 9. 
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Numbers of bankruptcies were initially remarkably low, arguably due to the 
high level of discretion accorded to the courts as to whether to accept 
bankruptcy cases, creditor reluctance to pursue proceedings and the 
involvement of government agencies through bailouts. 5   However more 
recently, there has been a scaling-back of government support and there 
have been some significant cases, such as the 2009 bankruptcy of 
FerroChina, which had significant numbers of foreign creditors and foreign 
bond holders, although concerns have been expressed as to possible 
inequality of treatment and distortions owing to political factors. 6   More 
recently, the Central Economic Work Conference in December 2015 
encouraged the use of bankruptcy proceedings in respect of uneconomic and 
virtually dead SOEs and there was a significant increase in the number of 
bankruptcy cases opened in 2016 with a further steady increase reported in 
the first half of 2017.  However, although there have also been major cross-
border restructurings involving companies with significant assets in China 
these have typically been in respect of companies that are incorporated 
overseas and have been carried out under court-based restructuring laws 
outside China.7   
 
As China’s booming trading grows in volume, in terms of both inbound and 
outbound trade, it is likely that there will be an increasing number of cross-
border insolvency cases involving China.  The 2006 law therefore included, in 
Article 5, a basic framework for cross-border insolvency cases of both kinds.  
This article can be viewed as a good start, or a first stage, in the development 
of Chinese cross-border insolvency laws.  However this single article is 
                                            
5 Yujia Jiang, “The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative 
Study of U.S. and Chinese Bankruptcy Law” (2014) 34 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 559. 
6 Umesh Desai and Michelle Price, “Amid China slowdown, foreign creditors face bankruptcy 
riddle”, Reuters Nov 30, 2015 8:14am EST. 
7 An example is that of such as that of Suntech, registered overseas but with significant 
Chinese assets, which entered liquidation in the Cayman Islands. “Suntech unit declared 
bankrupt” (2013, March 20) FT. The Cayman Islands liquidation was recognised under 
Chapter 15 in In re Suntech Power Holdings Co.; 14-10383, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern 
District of New York (Manhattan).  Interestingly, in that case, the prospect of Chinese 
insolvency proceedings was roundly rejected.  See also the order under the Companies’ 
Creditors Arrangement Act in respect of Sino-Forest, a company with the majority of its assets 
in China and a registered office in Canada Corporation Re Sino-Forest Corporation 2012 
ONSC 7050 (12 December 2012), Superior Court of Justice (Ontario, Canada). 
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arguably insufficient to deal with cross-border insolvencies on a long-term 
basis in China, since it is limited in application and lacks detailed guidance.  
Cross-border insolvency systems in more mature systems of insolvency laws, 
are commonly reaching what may be regarded as a third stage of 
development, explained below, and, just as it took those jurisdictions several 
years to reach this point, it will take many years for China to catch up.   
 
This article considers Article 5 and the possible future development of cross-
border insolvency laws in China, in three sections.  Firstly, it identifies the 
weaknesses of Article 5 and how it may be reformed in future, drawing upon 
international experiences. Secondly, it considers how the Chinese law may 
build a more advanced approach, concentrating initially on developing a 
guideline framework for use with its most important trading partners.  The 
clarification of Article 5 and the formulation of a guideline will potentially pave 
the way for a third and final stage, which is the formal adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in China. Most importantly, account must be taken of 
China’s unique social and legal background and special characteristics, which 
must shape the reforms at each of the three recommended developmental 
stages.   
 
II. Cross-border Insolvency Related Issues and 
Potential Problems in China 
 
Before the enactment of the Chinese EBL 2006, the concept of cross-border 
insolvency did not exist in Chinese national legislation, unsurprisingly, given 
the nascent and patchy nature of even domestic insolvency legislation at that 
time.8  Accordingly the Chinese legislators had not decided whether to follow 
the principle of universalism or to follow the principle of territorialism.9 This did 
not mean however that China had no cross-border insolvency cases. Such 
cases inevitably arose following the adoption of the opening up policies in 
                                            
8 R Parry and H Zhang, “Introduction” in R Parry, Y Xu and H Zhang (eds), China’s New 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Ashgate, 2009), p 9-14. 
9  Minkang Gu, “A Superior Win and an Inferior Loss: New Developments in Chinese 
Bankruptcy Laws and Regulations” (2008) 1 IJPR 130 
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1978 and, as might be expected, early approaches were territorial and based 
on civil procedure laws.   
 
Early reported examples were of inbound cases, where territorial approaches 
were adopted in cases concerning foreign companies.  For example, in 1990 
there was the Liwan District Construction Case, 10  in which Guangzhou 
Intermediate People’s Court applied a territorial approach so as to protect the 
interests of a Chinese party and thereby refused to recognise a Hong Kong 
representative who had been appointed under a Hong Kong insolvency 
proceeding.11 A territorial approach was again applied in the BCCI (Shenzhen 
Branch) Case in 1992, and Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court thereby 
made it possible for creditors in China to obtain repayment quickly and at a 
high level without participating in the BCCI worldwide liquidation 
proceedings.12 On the basis of these cases it might have been predicted that 
the Chinese courts would favour a territorial approach in dealing with cross-
border insolvency cases.13 However, in the case of the B & T Ceramic Group 
s.r.l. (referred to as B & T), the Foshan Intermediate People’s Court granted 
recognition of an insolvency judgment made by an Italian court. An important 
factor in this case was a Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters 
between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Italy, and the 
Foshan court also made its decision on the basis of public policy and other 
factors. As far as is ascertainable, this case was the first case in which a 
foreign insolvency judgment was recognised by a Chinese court.  
 
                                            
10  Liwan District Construction Company v. Euro-America China Property Limited, the 
defendant was a Hong Kong registered company which had concluded several contracts with 
the claimant. The claimant lodged a complaint in Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court 
based on the defendant’s breach of contract. The case became more complicated when the 
defendant was wound up by a Hong Kong court. 
11 Donald Lewis and Charles Booth, “Case Comment, Liwan District Construction Company v. 
Euro-America China Property Limted” (1990) 6 CLP 33-34 
12  Jingxia Shi, “Chinese Cross-Border Bankruptcy Law: Status, Problem and Future 
Development” (中国的跨界破产法：现状.问题及发展) (2002) 1 CLS 117 
13 Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law (1st edn Ashgate, Surrey 2009) 341 and 329 
 6 
The B&T case might have been taken to offer an insight into a possible future 
approach to cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases in China. 14 
However, although the Foshan Court formally recognised its Italian 
counterpart’s judgment, the Foshan court did not practically enforce the Italian 
court’s judgment, reflecting the “immaturity of the insolvency regime in dealing 
with cross-border issues in China.”15  
 
Later, there was the outbound bankruptcy case of Guangdong International 
Trust Investment Corporation 1999 (referred to as the ‘GITIC case’). GITIC 
was declared bankrupt by the Guangdong Province People’s High Court and 
placed under the control of a liquidation group, under the EBL 1986.  
Importantly, when the liquidation group paid out a dividend in the bankruptcy 
no distinction was made between Chinese and foreign creditors.16 In the light 
of this approach, the Hong Kong High Court recognised the Guangdong High 
Court’s insolvency proceeding against GITIC. This was an important case, 
indicating the importance of equal treatment of creditors as a prerequisite if 
outbound Chinese insolvency proceedings are to be recognised by foreign 
courts.17  
 
Stages of cross-border insolvency reforms 
There are arguably three stages to the development of cross-border 
insolvency laws under the following, broad, categorisation. The first stage is 
for a country to include in its legislation a provision that provides a basis for its 
courts to consider such cases.  There are several examples of countries that 
have taken such an approach at an early stage, notably the United States in 
the, now repealed sections 304-306 of US Code, Title 11, Canada18  and 
                                            
14  Jingxia Shi, “Chinese Cross-Border Bankruptcy Law: Status, Problem and Future 
Development” (中国的跨界破产法：现状.问题及发展) (2002) 1 CLS 118 
15 Qingxiu Bu, “China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL 2006): Cross-border Perspectives” 
(2009) 18 IIR 187,190 
16  Jingxia Shi, “Instance Analysis of the Extraterritorial Effect of China’s Insolvency 
Proceeding” (我国破产程序域外效力的实例分析) (2002) 3 TPSL 41-45 
17 Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law (1st edn Ashgate, Surrey 2009) 341 and 340 
18 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Part XIII. 
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Australia.19  This is the stage which China has reached, at least on paper, 
although these other jurisdictions have largely moved on to “third stage” of 
similar frameworks based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.  The second stage 
for China is likely to be the development of an approach to selected countries.  
A strong early example of such an approach is the Inter-Nordic Insolvency 
Convention. The European Union Regulation 20  provides the most 
sophisticated example, based on a high level of universality.  In a more limited 
way, the UK section 426 offers a greater level of assistance but only to 
“relevant countries or territories”.  If this was the second stage for China it 
would potentially provide a stronger basis for the consideration of cases 
involving its closest trading partners and would reflect the incremental 
approach to reform that has often been taken in China.21  The third stage is 
acceptance of a more general approach to such cases under a standardised 
approach without geographical limitation. Some countries that have adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law may be regarded as having reached this third 
stage. 
 
III. Comment and Analysis of Article 5 of the EBL 2006 
 
The inclusion of Article 5, the first provision to address cross-border 
insolvencies, represents “a stride towards international cooperation between 
Chinese courts and foreign counterparts when a cross-border case is 
initiated.” 22  However the scope of Article 5 is limited and its terms are 
ambiguous.  Article 5 consists of two paragraphs, respectively concerning the 
outbound effect of Chinese insolvency proceedings and the inbound effect of 
foreign insolvency proceedings in China.  There is considerable progress to 
be made before China can move on from this first stage and this article, later, 
considers how the laws at this first stage may be augmented. 
                                            
19 Corporations Law, ss 580 and 581 and Bankruptcy Act 1986, s 29. 
20 Council Regulation of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (EC) No 1346/2000. 
21 Linda Yueh, Enterprising China: Business, Economic, and Legal Developments Since 1979 
(OUP, 2011), 9; Hassane Cisse, Sam Muller, Chantal Thomas, Wang Chenguang (eds), The 
World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for Development (World Bank, 
2012), 175. 
22 Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law (1st edn Ashgate, Surrey 2009) 341 and 342 
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a) The Outbound Effect of Chinese Insolvency Proceedings  
Outbound effects are addressed briefly in a provision that may be translated 
in the following terms: “insolvency procedures commenced in accordance with 
this Law are binding on the debtor's property located outside the territory of 
the People's Republic of China”.  This approach may be regarded as an 
example of a universalist approach, envisaging “a single forum applying a 
single legal regime to all aspects of a debtor's affairs on a worldwide basis”.23 
This Article provides a legal foundation in respect of claims to the debtor’s 
assets situated outside of China. 24  However, the effectiveness of this 
provision is, of course, out of China’s hands, as it depends on overseas 
recognition of the law’s extraterritorial effects.25 Essentially, China hopes that 
the foreign courts will recognise China’s insolvency legal regime and the 
policies contained in China’s insolvency proceedings. 
 
A clearly defined Chinese insolvency proceeding with extraterritorial effect is 
often an important prerequisite and legal requirement for countries to 
recognise the Chinese insolvency proceedings.26 As the GITIC case suggests, 
this recognition is likely to depend as much on the manner in which foreign 
claims will be treated in the Chinese proceedings, as on the terms of 
paragraph 1 of Article 5.  It should also be noted, as discussed later, that 
recognition can provide a basis for reciprocity, which is important in respect of 
inbound proceedings under paragraph 2 of Article 5, and this can provide an 
incentive in favour of recognition of such proceedings.  
 
                                            
23 As described in the landmark judgment of the late Tina Brozman, Bankruptcy Judge in Re 
Maxwell Communications Corporation plc, 170 B.R. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 
186 B.R. 807, 812-815 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Scheindlin USDJ), aff'd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(Cardamone, Circuit Judge). 
24 Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law (1st edn Ashgate, Surrey 2009) 341 and 341 
25  Ibid, 341 and 341.  The recognition on 12th  August 2014, of the Zhejiang Topoint 
Photovoltaic Co. Ltd. bankruptcy proceeding by New Jersey bankruptcy court as foreign main 
proceeding is encouraging.   
26 Emily Lee and Karen Ho, “China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law-A Great Leap Forward, 
But Just How Far?” (2010) 19 IIR 145, 172 
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To augment the minimal detail of paragraph 1 of Article 5, it is arguably 
desirable for China to provide express powers for the Chinese courts or 
insolvency administrators to apply for recognition and assistance from foreign 
courts, as well as to explicitly stipulate the specific procedures as to how the 
administrator’s powers may be exercised. It would be desirable if paragraph 1 
expressly confirmed that the powers and obligations of insolvency 
administrators appointed by the Chinese courts also have extraterritorial 
effect, 27  in addition to setting out mechanisms for cooperation and 
communication between the office holder and the local courts.28  The inclusion 
of such provision would facilitate the handling of outbound cases, although it 
is also notable that foreign judges may lack the ability to act in the absence of 
an express statutory provision (this would also be the case for judges in China, 
in the absence of some express provision).29  
 
It is also notable that Article 5, paragraph 1 makes no distinction between 
main and non main proceedings.  A ‘centre of main interests’ approach to 
jurisdictional competence in respect of the opening of main insolvency 
proceedings is to be preferred, since it has regard to the actual circumstances 
of the debtor’s commercial activities and in recent years it has become the 
commonly applied approach to the opening of main proceedings.  For 
instance, Article 3(1) of the EU Insolvency Regulation stipulates that ‘the 
courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a 
debtor’s main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the 
registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the 
absence of proof to the contrary.’ Articles 2 of the Model Law and Paragraph 
                                            
27 An example of a provision giving such authorization is Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, giving authorization for an office holder to act in a foreign state.  This Article has been 
applied in the UK by the CBIR 2006, regulation 2.  Article 5, as applied, authorizes a British 
officeholder to act in a foreign State on behalf of a proceeding under British insolvency law, as 
permitted by the applicable foreign law.  Using the same Model Law, Section 1505 of Chapter 
15 of US Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee or another entity (including an examiner) to 
act in a foreign country. 
28 Articles 25 to 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, as adopted in both Great Britain and the US, 
stipulate provisions of cooperation and direct communication between the court, the 
insolvency administrator (the officeholder or trustee in the case of the CBIR and the Chapter 
15 respectively) and foreign courts and representatives and they are applied in Articles 25 to 
27 of the CBIR 2006 and Sections 1525 to 1527 of the Chapter 15 respectively. 
29 See Paragraph 213 of the UNCITRAL Model Law Enactment Guide 
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72 of its Enactment Guide have similar stipulations. Accordingly, for China, 
the adoption of the concept of non-main proceedings, in cases where the 
COMI is in another jurisdiction, as part of its cross-border insolvency legal 
framework would bring its approach into line with the dominant approach that 
is developing internationally, even while China remains at the first stage of 
development of cross-border insolvency laws. In order to make use of this 
concept and its accompanying system in determining jurisdictional issues, a 
first step that China should take is to rectify the existing flaw in Paragraph 1 of 
Article 5 so as to make it conform to the requirement of non-main proceedings 
only having territorial effect.   
 
b) The Inbound Effect of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings in 
China 
The simple declaration in Article 5 in respect of the universality of outbound 
proceedings contrasts markedly with the more complex and guarded 
approach to inbound proceedings, that is, those where an application is filed 
on the basis of a legally effective foreign insolvency judgment or decision in 
respect of the debtor’s assets located with the territory of the P.R.C.  Here a 
modified approach to universality30 is taken to enable the Chinese courts to 
grant recognition and enable enforcement in certain circumstances.31 “Where 
a judgment or decision entered into by a foreign court regarding the debtor’s 
property located within the P.R.C.’s territory requires acceptance and 
execution by a Chinese Court, the Chinese Court shall, based upon a relevant 
petition or request, consider the foreign judgment or decision and render the 
ruling of recognition and permission for enforcement in accordance with the 
international agreements to which the P.R.C. is a party, or based on a mutual 
reciprocity principle, after ascertaining that the proceeding does not violate the 
basic principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of China, does not 
damage the sovereignty, safety or social public interests of the state and does 
                                            
30 Ibid, 816. 
31 Emily Lee and Karen Ho, “China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law-A Great Leap Forward, 
But Just How Far?” (2010) 19 IIR 145, 172; Qingxiu Bu, “China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
(EBL 2006): Cross-border Perspectives” (2009) 18 IIR 187,191; Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu 
and Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (1st edn Ashgate, Surrey 2009) 
341 and 342 
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not damage the legitimate rights and interests of the debtors within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China.”32   
 
This may be regarded as an approach of modified universality.  Such an 
approach is not unusual in jurisdictions with modern insolvency systems, 
enabling the fairness of the foreign proceedings to be evaluated and giving 
scope for the interests of local creditors to be protected, and it is not 
surprising that China has taken this approach.  Article 5 can therefore only be 
viewed as having established an “in principle” framework for international 
cooperation in cross-border insolvency in China33 and the way forward at 
present remains uncertain. Generally, China’s stance in terms of the 
recognition of the extraterritorial effect of foreign insolvency proceedings is 
very vague, non-specific and conservative, and a Chinese court is very 
unlikely to deviate from the promulgated approach, based on either the 
treaties to which China is a party or on the basis of mutual reciprocity. 
Nonetheless the granting of recognition can facilitate cooperation in cross-
border insolvency cases34 and recent case law is encouraging. Although no 
reference to Article 5 was made by the Supreme Court in Thumb 
Environmental Technology Group v Sino-Environment Technology Group the 
court recognised the power of a foreign office holder to represent the 
company in respect of which he was appointed and held that the powers of 
the office holder would be governed by the laws of the place where the 
company was registered, in this instance Singapore.35  As this case indicates, 
civil procedure laws can provide an alternative basis for recognition of the 
position and powers of a foreign office holder. 
 
In line with normal Chinese processes for the development of the law, China 
could clarify Paragraph 2 of Article 5 by means of a judicial interpretation by 
                                            
32 See Paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the EBL 2006 
33 In the draft of the EBL 2006, there was a cross-border insolvency chapter. However, for the 
reason of maintaining social stability, only one broad article was included in the EBL 2006.  
34 Jinsong Yu and Jingxia Shi, “On Several Legal Issues of the Insolvency Involving Foreign 
Elements” 涉外破产的若干法律问题 (1996) 4 CSS 108-109 
35 [2014] No 20 Final Judgment of the Fourth Civil Division of the Supreme People’s Court, 
applying the Law on the Application of Law for Foreign-related Civil Legal Relationships of the 
People’s Republic of China, Article 14. 
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the Supreme People’s Court to provide Chinese courts with more concrete 
regulation in terms of its discretion in the recognition and enforcement of 
legally effective foreign insolvency judgments and decisions. This possibility is 
considered further in Section IV, below. 
 
1. Priority and Review Criteria in Respect of Recognition of Foreign 
Insolvency Proceedings 
 
The inclusion of this detail is required to resolve the problems of concurrent 
insolvency proceedings being exercised over the same debtor in practice. 
According to Article 3 of the EBL 2006, a bankruptcy case shall be governed 
by the court where the relevant debtor is domiciled.36 However domicile is a 
concept that is open to manipulation, for example in the case of a “letterbox” 
company, that uses incorporation for reasons of convenience and actually 
carries out no further activity in the jurisdiction in question.  As noted, the 
concept of COMI offers an approach to jurisdictional competence to open 
main proceedings that has wide international acceptance. 
 
2. Recognition and the Retrospective Effect of Foreign Insolvency 
Proceedings 
  
As a general rule, in order to comply with the spirit of international cooperation 
in cross-border insolvencies, 37  engender reciprocity and align with the 
exclusive jurisdiction stipulated in Article 3 of the EBL which states that “an 
insolvency case shall be governed by the court where the relevant debtor is 
domiciled”, the Chinese courts should be open to recognition of the 
extraterritorial effect of insolvency proceedings initiated in the debtor’s 
domicile.38 In particular, the recognition of foreign proceedings may help in the 
control of fraud.  If the Chinese court does not recognise the legal effect of 
initiation of the proceedings, fraudulent trading and repayment of individual 
                                            
36 See Article 3 of the EBL 2006 
37 See Article 2 (b)(c), Article 16 (3) of the Model Law  
38 Xinxin Wang and Jianbin Wang, “Analysis About China’s Acknowledging Extraterritorial 
Effect System of Foreign Bankruptcy Procedure and its Improvement” (我国承认外国破产程序
域外效力制度的解析及完善)’(2008) 6 LSM 10, 10-12    
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creditors between the two time points may be difficult to control, which would 
lead to an ineffectiveness of international cooperation in cross-border 
insolvency.39 
 
There is uncertainty as to whether, in a case where foreign proceedings are 
recognised, this recognition will have retrospective effect, and whether 
recognition has an effect on the disposal of property by a debtor within the 
Chinese border and repayment of debts to individual creditors between the 
time when the insolvency proceeding has been initiated in a foreign country 
and the time when the Chinese court recognises the judgment.40 It is likely 
that, for the purpose of protecting the legitimate rights of domestic creditors, 
China will expressly refuse the retrospective effect of a foreign insolvency 
proceeding except perhaps where recognition would strengthen international 
cooperation to circumvent a debtor’s fraudulent conduct.  
 
The proceedings should preferably be in the spirit of Article 17 (3) of the 
Model Law, which stipulates that “an application for recognition of a foreign 
proceeding shall be decided upon at the earliest possible time.”41  Delays can 
cause uncertainties and a loss of value of the estate.  In a similar vein, an 
expedited order granting “provisional relief” 42  may be desirable in urgent 
cases, to preserve the debtor’s estate, or protect the interests of creditors, 
including Chinese creditors.  Such an order is however unprecedented in 
Chinese laws and it is desirable that express provision be made to enable 
such an order to be made upon the request of a foreign office holder or court.   
 
3. Examination According to the Relevant International Treaties That 
China Has Concluded or Acceded to or According to the Principles of 
Reciprocity 
 
                                            
39 Ibid.  This is a point which was made, long ago, by Jitta, International Bankruptcy 
Codification (1895) 7 Jur Rev 305. 
40 See further at: Xinxin Wang and Jianbin Wang, “Analysis About China’s Acknowledging 
Extraterritorial Effect System of Foreign Bankruptcy Procedure and its Improvement” (我国承
认外国破产程序域外效力制度的解析及完善)’(2008) 6 LSM 10, 10-12    
41 See Article 17 (2) of the Model Law 
42 See e.g. Article 19 (1) of the Model Law  
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Paragraph 2 of Article 5 establishes a two part approach to the examination 
and acceptance of foreign bankruptcy judgments and decisions.  The first 
provides a basis for recognition, which requires that the judgment or decision 
should be in accordance with international treaties and reciprocity. The 
second examines various public policy factors, requiring that the judgment or 
decision must not be contrary to the basic principles of Chinese laws; and it 
should not impair sovereignty, national security, social public interests and the 
legitimate rights and interests of Chinese creditors.  
 
There is little case law to indicate how the courts will approach this provision.  
Regarding the first part, it is notable that, until now, China has not become a 
signatory to any bankruptcy-specific international treaties. It is likely that, 
instead, reference will be made to the numerous bilateral treaties on judicial 
assistance in civil and business matters that China has entered into, either on 
the basis that these are international treaties, or on the basis that they provide 
evidence of reciprocity. To date, there are over 40 countries which have 
concluded bilateral treaties in civil and business matters with China. Although 
these treaties are not bankruptcy specific, they do not typically exclude 
bankruptcy matters. Arguably the Chinese courts should follow the terms of 
the bilateral treaties in scrutinizing the requests to give extraterritorial effect to 
foreign insolvency proceedings, so as to decide whether or not to grant 
recognition. As previously noted, in the pre-EBL case of B & T Ceramic Group 
SRL, the Foshan Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong granted 
recognition to an insolvency judgment made by an Italian court, primarily on 
the basis of a Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters between the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Italy, as well as on the basis 
of public policy and other factors.43  Similarly, the two part approach under 
paragraph 2 indicates that the existence of a bilateral treaty is unlikely to be 
sufficient in itself, rather the court may have regard to public policy factors and 
must be satisfied that the judgment does not contravene the ordinary 
principles of Chinese law, that it is not detrimental to state sovereignty or 
                                            
43  See further Xinxin Wang and Jianbin Wang, “Analysis About China’s Acknowledging 
Extraterritorial Effect System of Foreign Bankruptcy Procedure and its Improvement” (我国承
认外国破产程序域外效力制度的解析及完善)’(2008) 6 LSM 10, 10-12    
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security and social public interests and that it does not harm the legitimate 
rights of interests of Chinese creditors.  It should be added that the B & T 
case was decided at the time of China’s accession to the WTO and it is 
unclear to what extent the decision may have been influenced by a need to 
show openness to foreign trade. 44   It is unclear how a case would be 
approached in the absence of similar political impetus. 
 
In the event that there is no bilateral treaty on judicial assistance in civil and 
business matters, or no bilateral treaty is considered applicable to Article 5, 
the Chinese courts are required conduct their examination on the basis of the 
principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity is a requirement in cases where 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgement is requested in China in 
the absence of a bilateral treaty.45  Existing examples do not augur well as a 
lack of reciprocity has commonly been used in China as a basis for a refusal 
to recognise a foreign judgment. 46   Reciprocity, broadly, entails an 
examination of whether the other state would recognise the effects of Chinese 
proceedings in similar circumstances.  Regard would therefore be had to how 
strictly a request for recognition would be considered in that other state.  
Under a strict approach to reciprocity, evidence of actual cooperation 
(whether in a case involving outbound Chinese proceedings, or, more loosely, 
proceedings from another country) might be required, although arguably it is 
preferable for reciprocity to be presumed unless there is evidence to the 
contrary.47 
 
To this end, it is notable that although reciprocity is a factor which has 
historically played an important role in cross-border insolvency proceedings, 
                                            
44 Wenliang Zhang, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: A Call for 
Special Attention to Both the “Due Service Requirement” and the ‘Principle of Reciprocity’” 
(2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 143, 161. 
45 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, art 268 (1991).  Wenliang Zhang, 
“Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: A Call for Special Attention to 
both the ‘Due Service’ Requirement and the ‘Principle of Reciprocity’” (2013) 12 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 143. 
46 Jerome A Cohen, “Settling International Business Disputes with China: Then and Now” 
(2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 555, 566-7. 
47 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, “Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of 
Law and Choice of Forum”, (1991) 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 457, 468 regarding concepts of 
reciprocity. 
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and still has a role in some jurisdictions,48 in more recent years, in order to 
facilitate international cooperation, the UNCITRAL Model Law, the EU 
Insolvency Regulation and most of the laws enacted by countries such as the 
US, UK, Australia and Canada and other Model Law adopting countries have 
almost completely abandoned any reciprocity requirement. For this reason, it 
is arguable that proceedings that have been opened in a country which has 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, or which has similarly abandoned any 
reciprocity requirement, should logically be regarded as meeting the 
reciprocity requirement under Article 5.49  
 
Although it is unlikely in the short term, an abandonment of a requirement of 
reciprocity would be a logical step for the development of the cross-border 
insolvency system.  This would not cause Article 5 to be an open gateway, 
rather the focus would turn instead to whether the foreign proceedings met 
the public policy requirements.   
 
4. Interpretation and Application of Public Policy Requirements 
 
Article 5 stipulates a very broad public policy reservation, namely that a 
foreign insolvency judgment or decision can be recognized and enforced only 
if it does not violate the basic principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of 
China, does not damage the sovereignty, safety or social public interests of 
the state and does not damage the legitimate rights and interests of the 
creditors within the territory of the People’s Republic of China. As might be 
expected, this is a more potentially restrictive approach than its equivalent 
under the EU Insolvency Regulation, which contains a provision50 enabling a 
Member State to refuse to recognise proceedings opened in another Member 
State on the basis that they are manifestly contrary to public policy, an 
exception which has been narrowly construed and appears limited to, for 
                                            
48 For example Switzerland,  
49 Xinxin Wang and Jianbin Wang, “Analysis About China’s Acknowledging Extraterritorial 
Effect System of Foreign Bankruptcy Procedure and its Improvement” (我国承认外国破产程序
域外效力制度的解析及完善)’(2008) 6 LSM 10, 10-12    
50 Council Regulation of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (EC) No 1346/2000, Art 26. 
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example, the fairness of legal processes.51  A similar exception, where the 
proceedings are manifestly contrary to public policy, appears in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and has been adopted in the versions of the Model 
Law adopted by countries such as the US and the UK. Again, this appears to 
be a narrow exception and it ought not to apply, for example, simply because 
creditors would be treated differently under one system, as compared with 
another.52  Under a similar approach to public policy a Chinese court would 
not be able to refuse recognition merely on the basis that different legal rules 
exist between Chinese laws and relevant foreign counterparts. However a 
more restrictive approach is likely. 
 
It is notable that Article 5 is expansive and it also stipulates that the 
recognition of a foreign insolvency judgment or decision should “not damage 
the legitimate rights and interests of the creditors within the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China”. The legal basis of such rights and interests is 
likely to be based on domicile, as Article 3 of the EBL 2006 stipulates that 
“bankruptcy cases shall be under the jurisdiction of the Chinese court at the 
place of the debtor’s domicile.” In a case where the creditor’s domicile is 
located within the territory of China, the legal basis of the legitimate rights and 
interests of the creditors refers to all rights and interests provided by all 
relevant Chinese laws, including the EBL 2006, since the Chinese court has 
jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings, and the foreign proceedings 
should not impact upon these. If, however, the debtor’s domicile is not located 
within the territory of China, other Chinese civil laws are applied instead of the 
EBL 2006 and in addition to foreign insolvency laws under a foreign 
insolvency judgment, since the Chinese court does not have the jurisdiction 
over the insolvency proceedings in this scenario. The term “damage to 
legitimate rights and interests of the debtors” can be interpreted as applying 
where “Chinese creditors cannot be treated fairly, therefore cannot enjoy the 
                                            
51 Re Eurofood IFSC [2006] 1 Ch 508, para 66. 
52 See e.g. McGrath and others v Riddell and another [2008] UKHL 21.  See Michael A. Garza, 
“When is Cross-Border Insolvency Recognition Manifestly Contrary to Public Policy” (2015) 
38 Fordham International Law Journal 1587. 
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same rights and interests”53 as local creditors.  Arguably some unfairness 
based on differential treatment is required and not simply that creditors 
receive less under one system than they would under another. However a 
narrow approach to public policy may be taken by the courts. 
 
IV. The Future Developmental Direction of China’s 
Cross-Border Insolvency Regime 
 
Article 5 represents only a starting point and there is considerable progress to 
be made at this first stage of development of the cross-border insolvency laws.  
The further development of these laws should arguably focus initially on the 
augmentation of Article 5.  The next stage can then be the development of a 
cooperation guideline with its closest trading partners.  This can then pave the 
way for the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
Completing Stage 1: The Issuing of a Judicial Interpretation to 
Clarify the Uncertainties in Article 5  
 
Gaps in Article 5 present “obstacles towards effective cooperation in the 
administration of the cross-border insolvency proceedings.” 54  It may be 
anticipated that any vagueness and uncertainties in Article 5 of the EBL 2006 
can initially be clarified by means of a Judicial Interpretation of the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law 2006. Judicial interpretations are commonly used to augment 
legislation in China.  For example, details regarding insolvency practitioner 
appointments and remuneration were addressed in this manner.55  In China, 
three competent authorities can issue judicial interpretations, namely the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the Supreme 
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The judicial 
                                            
53 Xinxin Wang and Jianbin Wang, “Analysis About China’s Acknowledging Extraterritorial 
Effect System of Foreign Bankruptcy Procedure and its Improvement” (我国承认外国破产程序
域外效力制度的解析及完善)’(2008) 6 LSM 10, 10-12    
54 Emily Lee and Karen Ho, “China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law-A Great Leap Forward, 
But Just How Far?” (2010) 19 IIR 145, 176 
55 See R Parry, “Administrator: Appointment and Remuneration” in R Parry, Y Xu and H 
Zhang (eds), China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Ashgate, 2009), Chapter 6. 
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interpretation has legal validity and is enforceable by law, but it cannot conflict 
with the Constitution and Laws by reason of the priority of the law at the 
higher level over that at the lower level.56  
 
As was mentioned above, such judicial interpretation can include the 
clarifications of matters including the priority and review criteria in respect of 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, the recognition process and the 
retrospective effect of foreign insolvency proceedings, the examination of 
foreign proceedings according to the relevant international treaties that China 
has concluded or acceded to or according to the principles of reciprocity, 
interpretation and application of reservation of public order and legitimate 
rights and interests of the creditors. However, such an interpretation can only 
clarify Article 5 and it would arguably only be suitable as an initial step 
towards providing the level of cooperation that will be required under the 
effective legal practice of China’s cross-border insolvency. The next stage 
would be the formulation of a soft-law cooperation guideline with the content 
of “cooperation language”.57  
 
Stage 2: Formulation of a Cooperation Guideline  
 
The development of a cooperation guideline would enable cross-border 
insolvencies in China to be more effectively deal with.  Such a guideline would, 
arguably be likely, initially, to be restricted to China’s closest trading partners. 
It might be wondered why the adoption of the Model Law is not the next stage.  
Indeed it must be predicted that sooner or later China will formally adopt the 
Model Law, reaching the third stage. However, due to some reasons uniquely 
attributed to the special characteristics of China (as were explained above), 
this third stage will take a long time to achieve in practice. This cooperation 
guideline will be more practicably realisable if it initially applies in relation to 
selected jurisdictions with whom China has close dealings, similar to the 
approach taken by some countries with mature cross-border insolvencies at 
                                            
56 Wei Li, “Judicial Interpretation in China” (1997) 5 WJI LDR 87, 87-88 
57 Steven Arsenault, “Leaping Over the Great Wall: Examining Cross-Border Insolvency in 
Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy Law” (2011) 21 IICLR 1, 22 
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earlier stages in the development of their laws.  At this second stage, it is 
arguably preferable for China to take a flexible measure, developing a 
cooperation guideline of a soft-law nature, to deal with both inbound and 
outbound cross-border insolvencies involving key trading partners.  
 
1 Suggested Chinese Cooperation Guideline in Cross-Border 
Insolvency  
 
 
One way to progress the development of a cross-border insolvency regime, 
while stopping short of legislative intervention, would be the adoption of a non 
statutory instrument to act as a guideline.  The United States experience is 
instructive here.  Non statutory instruments played an important role in 
facilitating the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the US and they 
remain important post-adoption. Notably, the US did not rush to adopt the 
Model Law, after its formal publication in 1997.  Instead, advantage was taken 
of non-governmental organizations’ legislation and practices to successfully 
accomplish the legal transformation several years later. It can be said that the 
formal adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the US in 2005 took a long 
time for what was an uncontroversial law reform, the delay being due to 
political reasons,58 but the adoption of this law is likely to be more difficult for 
China.  Ultimately the Model Law was adopted in the United States almost 
verbatim as Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code,59 while, as 
discussed below, China is likely to take a more cautious approach.  
 
Non statutory guidelines remain important in the United States.  A “Principles 
of the Law, Transnational Insolvency” project, has been developed by the 
American Law Institute (ALI).These principles were originally developed for 
use in relation to NAFTA countries, however they “now apply generally to 
provide interpretation and guidance on various cross-border insolvency issues 
                                            
58 See Elizabeth J Gerber, “Not All Politics Is Local: The New Chapter 15 to Govern Cross-
border Insolvencies” (2002-2003) 71 Fordham Law Review 2051, 2054. 
59 Jay Westbrook, “An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United States of the 
Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency” (19, October 2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162964 > accessed May 20, 2013 
 21 
that are left unclear in Chapter 15.”60 In addition, from the year of 2006 to the 
present, in the absence of clear national and regional legal rules to deal with 
procedural alignment of cross-border insolvency cases in a number of 
countries across the globe, the American Law Institute, together with the 
International Insolvency Institute has sponsored a global research project with 
the purpose of formulating “Global Principles for Cooperation in International 
Insolvency Cases”.61  
 
The above two intertwined and interactive routes jointly contribute to the 
development and improvement of the US cross-border insolvency regime. In 
the process of the improvement of the Chinese cross-border insolvency 
regime, it is strongly suggested that great attention should be paid to this US 
experience. Although China is a civil law country, the emulation of this 
approach is still arguably achievable. In fact, China has already started a 
process of interaction between governmental legislation and non-
governmental legislation. For instance, a Model Law of Private International 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000, drawn up by Chinese Institute of 
Private International Law (CIPIL), was supposed to be used only for reference 
by the governmental legislative and judicial bodies or other government 
departments working for foreign affairs.62 However, this soft-law Model Law of 
Private International Law of China was largely adopted in the foreign-related 
part of the draft Civil Code of China 2002.63 Equally plausibly, in the domain of 
cross-border insolvency, China might feasibly make use of the function of 
professional institutions, firms and practitioners. Cross-border insolvency 
legislation is both specialised and complex, for the reason that it requires 
lawmakers well versed in cross-border insolvency rules, specialized in both 
legal professional knowledge and accounting professional knowledge and 
                                            
60  John Barrett, Johnathan Bolton and Robert Tucker, “Risks and Problems of Forum 
Selection in a Cross-Border Insolvency Case” (2009) 4 NARII 1, 4 
61 See further Ian Fletcher and Bob Wessels, “A Final Step in Shaping Rules for Cooperation 
in International Insolvency Cases” (2012) 5 ICR 283, 283 
62 See further at: the Preamble of the Model Law of Private International Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 2000 
63 The Civil Code of China is still in its proposed draft period and has not yet been formally 
introduced.  
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having abundant experiences in handling insolvency cases.64 In addition, the 
drafting of cross-border insolvency legislation requires careful consideration 
for the reason that it touches upon the protection of domestic interests as well 
as requiring cooperation and coordination between the different national 
courts. In every country including China, the non-governmental institutions are 
endowed with the strengths of relatively sophisticated insolvency 
professionals and knowledge and may have access to more flexible legislative 
tools to circumvent the obstacles in the domain of cross-border insolvencies.  
 
One way in which professional expertise may be called upon to augment the 
skeletal cross-border insolvency legislation would be for the Chinese Institute 
of Private International Law, as one of the most influential Chinese non-
governmental academic organizations, to bear the responsibility to draw up a 
Chinese soft-law cooperation guideline in cross-border insolvency.  After the 
publication of this cooperation guideline, the Chinese official legislatures, 
judicial authorities or other relevant government departments could emulate 
the US approach of interaction between governmental legislations and this 
non-governmental cooperation guideline. If, in the light of legal practice, 
certain provisions of the Chinese cooperation guideline showed inadaptability 
or otherwise unsuitability, then these provisions could be revised or abolished. 
The ultimate aim of this cooperation guideline would be to promote and 
supplement the implementation of Article 5 of China’s EBL 2006 and its 
upcoming judicial interpretation, and to play a transitional role to smooth the 
way for the eventual adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in China.  
 
2 Main Content of the Chinese Cooperation Guideline in Cross-Border 
Insolvency  
 
China’s cooperation guideline would arguably have two main functions.  One 
would be to provide guidance as to the appropriate forum and applicable law 
in a particular case.  The guideline could stipulate different solutions in 
respect of cross-border insolvency legal disputes between China and its major 
                                            
64 American Law Institute, Principles of Cooperation Among the NAFTA Countries (1st edn 
Juris Publishing, Inc New York 2003) 1 
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trading partners, under provisions that are analogous to the rules of remission 
and transmission in the private international law. For instance, in order to 
regulate the cross-border insolvency disputes between China and America, 
the guideline could stipulate that these China-US disputes can refer to the US 
Chapter 15 as a guideline.    The other is to provide substantive provisions for 
cases that are handled under the guidelines.  It would be important to 
stipulate the relationship between the hard-law and this soft-law guideline. It is 
arguable that if we regard Article 5 of the EBL 2006 and its proposed judicial 
interpretation as the hard-law main body, then we can call this cooperation 
guideline a soft-law supplement.  
 
i) Explicitly Excluding Certain Types of Debtors From the Application Scope of 
China’s Cooperation Guideline 
 
In the Chinese context the categories of excluded debtors include natural 
persons (although personal insolvency legislation may soon be introduced on 
a regional basis), financial institutions such as banks and insurance 
companies, and public utility companies, reflecting the exclusions under the 
EBL. In contrast, both of the Model Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation 
apply to insolvency proceedings whether the debtor is a natural person or a 
legal person.65 This is mainly because systems of natural person bankruptcies 
are well established in western countries. However, China does not have a 
historical tradition and lawmaking experience of natural person bankruptcy.  
Indeed such bankruptcies have been thought of as culturally alien and 
therefore it is arguable that they should be excluded entirely, as they are from 
the scope of the EBL, until such time as they are introduced. 66  
 
In addition, financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies 
should be also excluded from the application scope of the proposed Chinese 
cooperation guideline. Precisely because of the particularity of financial 
institutions, the Model Law adopting counties, such as the UK and the US 
                                            
65 See further at Recital (9) of the EU Insolvency Regulation   
66 Paragraph 66 of the UNCITRAL Model Law Enactment Guide refers only to the possible 
exclusion of consumer bankruptcies. 
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exclude financial institutions from the scope of application of their cross-
border insolvency legislations, as does the EU Insolvency Regulation, and 
consequently the EU has addressed such institutions by means of special 
directives, namely, the EU Directive on the Reorganization and Winding-Up of 
Credit Institutions (2001/24/EC) and the EU Directive on the Reorganization 
and Winding-Up of Insurance Undertakings (2001/17/EC). In China, Article 
134 of the EBL 2006 established on a preliminary basis the legal framework 
for the insolvencies of financial institutions, but it did not refer to the cross-
border insolvencies of financial institutions. For this reason, for the 
improvement of this legal framework, it is appropriate to consider the 
principles that should apply in the event of a cross-border insolvency of a 
financial institution. Cross-border financial institution insolvencies arguably 
require global solutions, given the interconnected nature of financial markets.  
 
ii) Clear Stipulation of the Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Proceedings in China  
 
A Chinese cooperation guideline should clearly stipulate means for 
determining the appropriate jurisdiction in respect of the opening cross-border 
insolvency cases. In this regard, the obvious approach is to adopt the concept 
of centre of main interests, “COMI”, that is widely employed in cross-border 
insolvency instruments, as previously discussed, and the concept of an 
“establishment” in respect of non-main proceedings, as under both the Model 
Law and the EU Regulation. 67  Unlike main proceedings, non-main 
proceedings merely have territorial effect to cover the debtor’s assets located 
within the territory of the state that opens such proceedings.  They may, to a 
large extent, be regarded as a complication to be avoided, with cases more 
efficiently handled by employing instead the extraterritorial effects of the main 
proceedings to deal with the assets in the relevant jurisdiction.  
 
                                            
67 See Article 17 (3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Article 3 (2) of the EU Insolvency 
Regulation 
 25 
The terms “COMI” and ”establishment” are both very important as the Model 
Law’s criteria of recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and the 
application of measures for relief.68  As terms in common usage and with 
developing approaches to their common interpretation, it is desirable that 
these terms should be adopted more widely, including under any Chinese 
cooperation guideline.  Therefore, under the guideline, it would be desirable 
for foreign proceedings to be recognized either as foreign main proceedings 
or foreign non-main proceedings on the basis of these concepts.69 If a foreign 
proceeding was recognized as a foreign main proceeding, the guideline would 
provide, as Model Law provides, an automatic stay of proceedings by 
creditors against the foreign debtor’s assets.70 If a foreign proceeding was 
recognized as a foreign non-main proceeding, the guideline would provide, as 
the Model Law provides, that all reliefs are discretionary.71 As under the EU 
Insolvency Regulation, main proceedings would have extraterritorial effect, 
whereas the effects of non-main proceeding would be restricted to the assets 
of the debtor situated within the territory of the state where non-main 
proceedings were opened.72  
 
There would be two likely purposes for foreign non-main proceedings, if 
employed under a Chinese cooperation guideline. First, non main 
proceedings could be opened in the interests of Chinese creditors after the 
recognition of foreign main insolvency proceedings by a Chinese court, rather 
than Chinese creditors having to participate in those foreign proceedings so 
as to obtain repayment. This would primarily be a protectionist measure, 
reflecting that claiming in foreign proceedings is not only inconvenient for 
Chinese creditors, but also would not be conducive to the protection of the 
legitimate rights and interests of Chinese creditors, for the reason that 
different national insolvency laws have different priorities in respect of the 
                                            
68 See Paragraph 15 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2006 
69 See Article 17 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
70 See Paragraph 126 of the UNCITRAL Model Law Enactment Guide 
71 See Paragraph 153 of the UNCITRAL Model Law Enactment Guide 
72 See Article 27 of the EU Insolvency Regulation 
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claims of creditors.73 Second, after the recognition of foreign main insolvency 
proceeding by a Chinese court, a foreign insolvency representative might also 
request that the Chinese court assists in the implementation of the foreign 
insolvency proceeding and liquidation of the debtor’ assets located within 
China, and a local liquidator may be better able to accomplish this if 
secondary proceedings are opened in China.74 Preferably, the cooperation 
guideline should imitate the Model Law’s provisions in terms of enabling the 
court to cooperate and coordinate with foreign courts or foreign 
representatives in the situation of concurrent proceedings regarding the same 
debtor. 
 
The introduction of the distinction between main and non-main insolvency 
proceedings is arguably the core issue for China in the further development of 
its legislation concerning the recognition of the extraterritorial effect of foreign 
insolvency proceedings. The employment of such concepts would primarily 
help to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese creditors75 but 
they could also be conducive to better enforcement of foreign insolvency 
judgments and better assistance of foreign insolvency proceedings to realize 
their extraterritorial effect. 76  The distinction between main and non-main 
proceedings is reasonable and workable, and it can fill one of the legal blanks 
in China’s EBL 2006.   
 
A Chinese cooperation guideline should also explicitly stipulate the applicable 
law in cross-border insolvency proceedings, since insolvency is often 
specified as an exception to more general choice of law rules and “instead the 
insolvency-specific doctrines of universality and territoriality have framed the 
discussion of choice of law issues.”77 The approach taken by UNCITRAL in its 
“Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” is that, in normal situations, the 
                                            
73 Xinxin Wang and Jianbin Wang, “Analysis About China’s Acknowledging Extraterritorial 
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76 See also at 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 
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insolvency proceedings are regulated by the law of the state in which those 
insolvency proceedings were opened (the lex fori concursus) and in special 
situations, there are some exceptions to the application of the lex fori 
concursus.78 The application of the lex fori concursus provides certainty as to 
the applicable law in respect of the effects of the proceedings, including in 
relation to creditor entitlements, the treatment of claims, the treatment of 
contracts and the avoidance of vulnerable transactions, reflecting the goals of 
insolvency laws in that state and minimising the extent to which litigation is 
necessary to determine the applicable law. “Thus, in many circumstances the 
application of the lex fori concursus for insolvency effects may reduce costs 
and delays and therefore maximize the value of the insolvency estate for the 
benefit of all creditors.”79 This approach provides the logical model for the 
development of the Chinese system and China could stipulate as a general 
principle that the lex fori concursus is the applicable law, applying to all 
aspects of the commencement, conduct, administration and conclusion of 
those insolvency proceedings.80..  However, UNCITRAL has also noted that 
some exceptions may be necessary in determining the effects of an 
insolvency on valid and effective rights and claims, for example in relation to 
employment contracts and security interests, so that those effects might be 
governed by the same law as governs questions of validity and effectiveness 
of the claim, in the interests of parties who have relied on the particular 
economic and social context in that jurisdiction.81  Therefore it is desirable that 
there should, in some instances, be a modification of the choice of law rule, 
given the likely differences in laws relating to matters such as employment law, 
                                            
78 See Paragraph 80-85 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2006 
79 See Paragraph 91 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2006 
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between China and other jurisdictions.  Such an approach would be likely to 
encourage cooperation while not undermining certainty unduly. 
 
 
(B) Application to Main Trading Partners 
 
An approach that is likely to encourage the adoption of the guidelines by 
China is the restriction to China’s main trading partners. The most obvious 
starting point for China in this regard would lie with inter-regional cross-border 
insolvency cooperation with Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(referred to as HKSAR), which was mainland China’s second largest trading 
partner in 2016. This selection of Hong Kong would provide a relatively easy 
start for China’s cross-border insolvency cooperative approach. This is 
because, first of all, under the background of “one country, two judicial 
systems”, HKSAR, as a region with the common law tradition, is more likely to 
establish a cooperation mechanism in cross-border insolvency with mainland 
China.82 Second, it is noteworthy that, thus far, the GITIC case was the first 
and the only insolvency proceeding opened in mainland China that was 
recognized by a foreign jurisdiction (the Hong Kong High Court). For this 
reason, the GITIC case may serve as evidence of potential reciprocity and so 
have a positive effect on mainland China and HKSAR’s future cross-border 
insolvency judicial practices.  
 
A cooperative outcome between the mainland and HKSAR can potentially be 
achieved by means of a bilateral agreement in accordance with Article 95 of 
the Basic Law of HKSAR. 83  Various agreements in respect of judicial 
cooperation between Hong Kong and China have previously been achieved 
using this Article. None have yet concerned insolvency law but the 
development of such an agreement would seem a logical step, following the 
enactment of the EBL 2006.  A bilateral agreement with HKSAR, would 
                                            
82 See further at: Xinyi Gong, “When Hong Kong Becomes SAR, Is the Mainland Ready? 
Problems of Judgments Recognition in Cross-border Insolvency Matters” (2011) 20 IIR 57, 
72-73 
83 Ibid, 73 
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enable the Chinese courts to gain valuable experience of cooperation in 
cross-border insolvency cases. This experience would not only have the 
potential to lead to the realization of greater levels of cross-border insolvency 
cooperation in the Region of Greater China, including Taiwan Island (the 
eleventh largest trading partner of China in 2016), 84  but it would also 
potentially enable China to gain experience of cross-border insolvency 
cooperation with countries of the common law tradition.  
 
It is also notable that China is the largest trading partner of the ASEAN, the 
Association of South East Asian Nations. China could arguably include 
specific provision for dealings with ASEAN.  One possibility would be a 
provision that the relevant parties could use the EU Insolvency Regulation or 
the UNCITRAL Model Law as persuasive referential legislations in the event 
that cross-border insolvency problems occurring within the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area. For another instance, if the same problems happened 
between China and a member state of the European Union (the largest 
trading partner of China in 2012), the cooperation guideline could specify that 
the EU Insolvency Regulation or the UNCITRAL Model Law also could also 
be set as referential legislations on a persuasive but not binding basis. 
 
Last but not the least, the cooperation guideline could stipulate that China 
could deal with cross-border insolvency problems with certain major trading 
partners by reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law in the situation where that 
major trading partner is one of the Model Law adopting countries. Among 
China’s Top 10 trading partners in 2016, there are three Model Law adopting 
countries. They are the United States, Japan and South Korea.  A compelling 
basis for this approach would be that the adoption of the Model Law by these 
countries is suggestive that cases would be approached on a reciprocal basis. 
 
To sum up, formulating a cooperation guideline can be viewed as a 
transitional approach to the cross-border insolvency cooperation problems in 
                                            
84 The Region of Greater China is a term used to refer to Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, 
Marco SAR and Taiwan Island. Sometimes, it includes Singapore. This term is used merely 
for referring to the cultural and economic ties between the relevant territories, and is not 
intended to imply sovereignty. 
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China, augmenting Article 5 and facilitating the resolution of cases in 
particular concerning China’s main trading partners. Meanwhile, this guideline 
is also a beneficial supplement to the hard-law rules. Ultimately, the purpose 
of Stages 1 and 2 is to pave the way for the realization of Stage 3, which is 
China’s formal adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.   
 
 
Stage 3: Formal Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in China 
 
This part will address three logically related questions: whether China should 
adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law; the reasons why it has not yet done so; and 
the specific terms of any future adoption by China.  
 
1 Should China Adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law? 
 
After the previous two stages of the suggested developmental process, at the 
third stage, China could formally adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law as a long-
term approach to cross-border insolvency. However, in doing so, account 
should be taken of China’s unique political, economic, cultural and legal 
milieu.85 If a law is to be absorbed by China, it should arguably be Sinicized. 
That is arguably so in relation to every aspect of law and it is also so in the 
domain of cross-border insolvency. One notable factor is that China is still 
very much state-led in relation to its economy, politics and, of course, legal 
developments, and that, in spite of considerable progress having been made 
since 1978 in opening up its markets, China remains unwilling to enter into full 
and unreserved integration into the US-led globalization process.86 Instead, 
China is deeply convinced of the correctness of its prudent approach, self-
tailored to China’s unique national circumstances and it has followed a 
gradual approach to integration with the trend of globalization. China is likely 
                                            
85 See further Weiwei Zhang, The China Wave: Rise of A Civilizational State (1st edn World 
Century,  USA 2012)  
86Mark Weisbrot, ‘”2016: when China overtakes the US” (The Guardian official Website 27 
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to continue to pursue this approach in the future, including in relation to such 
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law as China may adopt.  It is likely that 
there will be a period of transition, prior to the time of formal adoption, in 
which a cautious, tailored and gradual process will be undergone.   
 
China, as one of the Member States of UNCITRAL, sent representatives to 
attend previous discussions about the Model Law but it has not yet adopted 
the Model Law. It is arguable that, if a suitable means of adoption can be 
found, China could repeal Article 5, following the example of the United States, 
which repealed Section 304 following its adoption of the Model Law. However, 
it is unlikely that this stage will be reached in the near future.  China may wait 
one decade or even longer before the final realization of the formal adoption 
of the Model Law. It must be remembered that before the official promulgation 
of China’s EBL 2006 on August 27, 2006, the Chinese legislators took about 
12 years for the purpose of consultation and deliberation.  Circumstances 
were not suitable for the enactment of this law to have taken place at an 
earlier stage and it was only when internal and external pressures for reform 
grew that legislative action was taken.87  The new law has been slow to have 
impact and it follows from this that developments in respect of cross-border 
insolvencies may yet be gradual and that significant progress will not be made 
until internal and external drivers again exert sufficient persuasion. 
 
2 Why Has China Not Formally Adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law 
Thus Far? 
 
Adoption of the Model Law could enhance the Chinese cross-border 
insolvency framework by providing a foreign insolvency representative, 
appointed in proceedings in a country in which the debtor has its COMI, with 
an avenue through which to seek the recognition of those insolvency 
proceedings in China.  However, a combination of the nature of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, the relatively limited success of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and the special characteristics of China have arguably resulted in the 
                                            
87 R Parry and H Zhang, “China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles” 
(2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113 
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outcome of the UNCITRAL Model Law not having been formally adopted in 
China thus far.   
 
Although the UNCITRAL Model Law has attracted almost no negative 
comments on its provisions from the academic and practice circle, it is 
obvious that it has only achieved limited success in terms of “quantity of the 
Law’s provisions that are adopted and quality of the implementation 
provisions as an accurate embodiment of their intended substance.”88 This is 
because the UNCITRAL Model Law is not a hard-law treaty or convention but 
a non-binding soft-law text, which countries can freely choose whether or not 
to adopt, and, if adopting, they can do so with or without significant adaptation.  
It is notable that a nonbinding instrument of this nature is more likely to be 
favoured for adoption by countries of a common law tradition, rather than 
those of a civil law tradition, such as China.89  At the time of writing, twenty 
years after the adoption of the text of the Model Law, 44 countries and 
territories in the world have adopted the Model Law, with numbers having 
swelled considerably in 2015 through the collective adoption by the 17 
OHADA countries.  
 
The ability for a state to decide for itself how best to incorporate the Model 
Law is a factor that favours the adoption of the law, however it is also notable 
that exceptions and concessions have undermined the quality and 
effectiveness of adoptions90 and “the more changes that are made to the text 
of the Model Law, the less the harmonization effect of the resulting domestic 
legislation.”91 Among those 44 countries and territories that have adopted the 
Model Law, there have been few who have done so without significant 
modification.  For instance, in order to protect its national interest, South 
Africa adopted the most restrictive reciprocity provision which means that the 
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adoption of the Model Law is not an effective guarantee of reciprocity under 
the South African law. In addition, the “road” of the Model Law adopting 
countries after they have crossed the obstacle of adoption has not always 
been smooth, as discussed below.  
 
Due to the special characteristics of China, the process of legal “transplanting” 
of foreign and international laws can be fraught with difficulties. Other civil law 
jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law but China would be likely to require 
particular modifications. Any legal transplantation must integrate foreign and 
international laws with Chinese realities and the Model Law would be no 
exception.  
 
 
3 What Might be the Macro Deviations of China’s Adoption? 
 
UNCITRAL recommends that countries make as few changes as possible in 
incorporating the Model Law into their legal systems, in order to achieve a 
satisfactory degree of harmonization and certainty.92 In spite of this, several 
adopting countries have made deviations and it is arguable that China will 
adopt significantly restrictive terms if formally adopting the Model Law. In 
other words, China will continue to hold a very cautious and conservative 
legislative attitude.  Possible restrictions and deviations are suggested by 
those taken by adopting nations so far.  
 
The most likely deviation is a reciprocity requirement. It is suggested that 
reciprocity results in a view of a less cooperative approach to cross-border 
insolvency issues,93 and it is not a requirement that is included in the Model 
Law, yet this approach has been followed by several adopting countries.94 
                                            
92 See Paragraph 20 of the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (2014). 
93 David Marks, “Review of ‘Look Chan Ho (ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency: A Commentary on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law’” (2010) 4 ICR 278, 278 
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The British Virgin Islands, 95  Mexico, 96  Romania, 97  South Africa 98  and 
Mauritius99 have all included either an express reciprocity requirement or have 
restricted the law to designated countries. The latter limitation is particularly 
restrictive and, if no countries are designated, the Model Law fails to be 
practicably effective.  In contrast, the US, UK, Canada100 and Australia have 
adopted the Model Law with no reference to reciprocity of any sort.  
 
It is probable that if China adopts the Model law, China will include a 
reciprocity requirement, in order to limit the scope of application of the Law, 
given that Article 5 of the EBL is restricted in this manner. 101 The conditions of 
reciprocity can vary but Westbook has identified two variations, positive 
reciprocity, under which regard is had to whether the courts of the requesting 
country are positively cooperative, and negative reciprocity, which permits 
courts to cooperate unless there is evidence that the other jurisdiction would 
not do so.102  It is likely that the adoption of the former, more restrictive, 
approach would be taken by China.  However, arguably any state which had 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law without significant limitation ought to be 
taken as demonstrating positive reciprocity.  
 
Less controversially, there is the possible exclusion of certain entities from the 
scope of application. Article 1 (2) of the Model Law contemplates the 
exclusion of certain types of entity, such as banks or insurance companies, for 
                                            
95 British Virgin Islands Insolvency Act 2003, s 437, confining the application of the law to 
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the reason that they are subject to special insolvency regimes in each country. 
However, almost all of the Model Law adopting countries’ exclusions are very 
much wider than those that are contemplated by the Model Law. 103  For 
instance, Great Britain excludes not only UK credit institutions and insurance 
companies but also European Economic Area (EEA) and third country credit 
institutions and insurance companies from the application scope. 104  It is 
understandable that the former category of entities should be excluded but the 
exclusion of the latter category of entities has the possibility to trigger 
unnecessary inconsistencies in the law.105 Another example is the US, which 
excludes investment institutions, stock exchanges, insurance undertakings, 
clearing houses, brokers and traders, banks, railroads, stockbrokers and 
commodity brokers but not foreign insurance companies.106 The greater the 
range of exceptions, the more that the coverage of the Model Law is 
undermined and “it is unclear how excluding such a variety of institutions that 
have a potential to involve assets in multiple countries really serves the Model 
Law’s purpose.”107  
 
It is probable that if China adopts the Model law, China will also follow in the 
US and UK’s footsteps to exclude financial institutions from the application 
scope of the Chinese version of the Model Law, dealing with such institutions 
under specialised laws. This is not an unusual approach, internationally, but 
the insolvencies of financial institutions are sensitive in China, in particular 
given the important role which savings have played in Chinese culture.  A 
rudimentary framework is established in Article 134 of China’s EBL 2006, 
which is China’s first legal provision enabling the opening of insolvency 
proceedings in respect of financial institutions. This article applies to “financial 
institutions including but not limited to commercial banks, securities 
companies, insurance companies”, which meet the tests of Article 2 of the law.  
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It provides that a petition for reorganisation or liquidation may be presented to 
the People’s Court by financial supervisory and regulatory institutions under 
State Council, rather than by the debtor or its creditors.  It may be noted that 
this remains an area in which state control is retained, even if it has ostensibly 
been removed elsewhere. The Article provides that if the financial supervisory 
and regulatory institution under State Council takes over a financial institution 
with material business risks or takes it under custody, it may petition the 
People’s Court to stay civil litigation procedures or execution procedures in 
which the financial institution is the defendant or the party against which the 
execution procedure is filed, as the case may be. Naturally, one article is 
insufficient to address this complex issue and implementation measures are 
to be formulated in accordance with the EBL and other relevant laws.108 The 
State Council of China first proposed to enact special legislation in respect of 
financial institution insolvency in its 12th Five-Year Plan for the Development 
and Reform of the Financial Industry in 2012. 109  There have been few 
subsequent developments. The latest development was the Deposit 
Insurance Regulation which was promulgated for implementation as of 1st 
May 2015. We can see from the above two points that the development of a 
specialist framework for such insolvencies, under a similar approach to that 
taken in the US and UK, will probably lead to the exclusion of financial 
institutions from the application scope of any future Chinese version of the 
Model Law. 
 
More generally, a public policy exclusion is likely. Article 6 of the Model Law 
stipulates that the court of the enacting country can refuse to recognize a 
foreign judgment or the application of foreign law if the action would be 
“manifestly” contrary to the public policy of the enacted country.110 The word 
“manifestly” indicates that the public policy “exception” is limited only to the 
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situation where the foreign insolvency judgment is contrary to the most 
fundamental policies or rights of the state.111 Some adopting countries, such 
as the UK, US and Australia, have followed Article 6 of the Model Law 
verbatim. However, some other adopting countries, such as Canada, have 
omitted the word “manifestly” while adopting Article 6 of the Model Law. The 
Canadian version of the Model Law gives Canadian courts greater discretion 
since it merely stipulates that the Canadian courts can refuse to do something 
that would be contrary to public policy, not “manifestly contrary to public 
policy”.112 China, as one of the Member States of UNCITRAL, “wanted the 
word “manifestly” to be removed from Article 6 but it was not able to persuade 
the Working Group to agree.”113 Obviously, it is likely, in view of this, that the 
word “manifestly” will be omitted as a qualifier in such Chinese version of the 
Model Law as may be adopted in future, giving the courts greater flexibility to 
refuse to recognise foreign proceedings. 
 
Another issue is whether the adoption of the Model Law is a replacement for 
other cross-border insolvency laws (such as possible country-specific 
measures discussed in Part III above) or, as in the UK, whether it will added a 
further option to a menu of cross-border insolvency laws.114 In view of space 
limitations and the logical structure of this article, the details of each will not 
be dealt with here. 115  To sum up, the final realization of Stage 3 of the 
development of China’s cross-border insolvency legal regime would entail 
China’s formal adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, although it is submitted 
that this development might take at least a decade. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Domestic Chinese insolvency law remains in its infancy.  State control of 
proceedings may have, looking at legislation on the surface, been cut back 
but the limited impact of the new insolvency law suggests that considerable 
control remains, in practice and behind the scenes, in spite of rising numbers 
of cases.  Moreover, overseas creditors may be reluctant to use such a 
rudimentary law and it is likely that filings in China will be avoided by such 
creditors where possible.  It follows that a cautious approach will continue to 
be taken in respect of Chinese cross-border insolvencies.  The only cross-
border insolvency provision in the Chinese EBL 2006, which is Article 5, 
merely provides a starting point for the consideration of this complex area of 
law and this article has suggested a three stage process for further 
development of this area of law, reflecting the incremental approach to law 
reform that has taken place in other areas.  The first stage is to complete the 
domestic provision by the issuing of a judicial interpretation for the purpose of 
legally clarifying the uncertainties in Article 5. The second stage is to 
formulate a cooperation guideline of a soft-law nature, to deal with both 
inbound and outbound cross-border insolvencies involving key trading 
partners. The third stage is the formal adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
in China, although in a greatly modified form, reflecting some of the 
restrictions made by other jurisdictions.  
 
